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<!--Generated by Squarespace V5 Site Server v5.13.156 (http://www.squarespace.com) on Mon, 20 May 2013 07:39:50 GMT--><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><title>Blog</title><subtitle>Blog</subtitle><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/</id><link rel="alternate" type="application/xhtml+xml" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/"/><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/atom.xml"/><updated>2013-03-31T01:56:50Z</updated><generator uri="http://five.squarespace.com/" version="Squarespace V5 Site Server v5.13.156 (http://www.squarespace.com)">Squarespace</generator><entry><title>Embedded Trust (P2): U-Boot Secured Boot</title><category term="DIY"/><category term="U-Boot"/><category term="embedded"/><category term="kernel"/><category term="sboot"/><category term="tpm"/><category term="trust"/><category term="vip"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2013/2/11/embedded-trust-p2-u-boot-secured-boot.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2013/2/11/embedded-trust-p2-u-boot-secured-boot.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2013-02-12T05:55:41Z</published><updated>2013-02-12T05:55:41Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>This post will function as a short walk through for installing and using a <span class="caps">TPM </span>on a BeagleBone to implement a Secured Boot (wooo...). I will use an example Secure Boot implementation called libsboot for U-Boot. Let's jump right in with a schematic for the (mostly) required additions to the BeagleBone.</p>
<p><span class="thumbnail-image-block ssNonEditable"><span><a href="javascript:showFullImage('/display/ShowImage?imageUrl=%2Fstorage%2Fpost-images%2Ftpm-schematic.png%3F__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION%3D1360648964769',674,970);"><img src="http://prosauce.org/storage/thumbnails/14746632-21904960-thumbnail.jpg?__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION=1360649022602" alt="" /></a></span></span></p>]]></summary></entry><entry><title>Defcon 20 NFPC Round 4 - Easy Mode</title><category term="CTFs"/><category term="Defcon 20"/><category term="forensics"/><category term="networking"/><category term="nfpc"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/8/2/defcon-20-nfpc-round-4-easy-mode.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/8/2/defcon-20-nfpc-round-4-easy-mode.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2012-08-02T06:02:14Z</published><updated>2012-08-02T06:02:14Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>This is an 'easy mode' guide to the <a href="http://forensicscontest.com/">NFPC</a> at Defcon 20. Let's begin: starting at packet 253, there is a TCP/LPD session from 10.0.1.4 to 10.0.1.3. A quick scan of the reconstructed session reveals little:</p>

<p><center><span class="full-image-block ssNonEditable"><span><img src="http://prosauce.org/storage/post-images/dc20nfpc-r4-lpd-stream.png?__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION=1343888103052" alt=""/></span></span></center></p>

Having never seen LPD traffic, we gave the <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1179.txt">RFC 1179</a> a quick read, lucky it's relatively short.]]></summary></entry><entry><title>Embedded Trust (P1): Beginning to trust my BeagleBone</title><category term="DIY"/><category term="Hardware"/><category term="embedded"/><category term="trust"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/7/5/embedded-trust-p1-beginning-to-trust-my-beaglebone.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/7/5/embedded-trust-p1-beginning-to-trust-my-beaglebone.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2012-07-06T05:57:05Z</published><updated>2012-07-06T05:57:05Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>I plan to have a series of posts outlining my curiosity with embedded development and trust. Let's start with poking around where my (our) trust lies when deciding on a SoC for embedded development, using the <a href="http://beagleboard.org/bone/">BeagleBone</a> [<a href="http://beagleboard.org/static/beaglebone/latest/Docs/Hardware/BONE_SRM.pdf"><span class="caps">SRM</span></a>] as an example. In this post we'll move trust from CircuitCO's (the Bone manufacture) included bootloaders, <a href="http://www.angstrom-distribution.org/">Angstrom</a> Linux kernel, and Angstrom development environment to your own compiled bootloaders, kernel, and <span class="caps">OS.</span></p>
]]></summary></entry><entry><title>How To: DIY (Improved) Inexpensive Fog Screen</title><category term="DIY"/><category term="Fun"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/6/10/how-to-diy-improved-inexpensive-fog-screen.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/6/10/how-to-diy-improved-inexpensive-fog-screen.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2012-06-10T18:44:40Z</published><updated>2012-06-10T18:44:40Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>Last month we built an improved version of the <span class="caps"><span class="caps"><span class="caps">DIY</span></span></span> Fog Screen found <a href="http://www.finkbuilt.com/blog/diy-fog-screen/">here</a>.</p>
<center><p><span class="thumbnail-image-inline ssNonEditable" style="display: inline;"><span><a href="javascript:showFullImage('/display/ShowImage?imageUrl=%2Fstorage%2Fpost-images%2Ffogscreen-final04.JPG%3F__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION%3D1339355129949',782,1024);"><img src="http://prosauce.org/storage/thumbnails/14746632-18678101-thumbnail.jpg?__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION=1339355670411" alt="" /></a></span></span><span class="thumbnail-image-inline ssNonEditable" style="display: inline;"><span><a href="javascript:showFullImage('/display/ShowImage?imageUrl=%2Fstorage%2Fthumbnails%2F14746632-18678184-thumbnail.jpg%3F__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION%3D1339382001217',125,191);"><img src="http://prosauce.org/storage/thumbnails/14746632-18678192-thumbnail.jpg?__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION=1339382001218" alt="" /></a></span></span></p></center>
<p>We call it "improved" since we managed to create a thinner sheet of fog, maintain the projection longer (a fog machine is bursty), and thicken the sheet. We use the same technique of creating a laminar flow. Instead of using a window fan we installed 10 120mm [17] computer fans with a variable speed controller [20] to optimize the flow, since we did not know the fog density.</p>
<p>Since the original article doesn't explain the steps / tools / resources required to create a <em><span class="caps"><span class="caps"><span class="caps">DIY</span></span></span> Fog Screen</em>, we'd like to take the opportunity and provide a  "how to". In a nut shell, the screen needs to distribute "fog machine"-fog from end-to-end, width-wise, and keep the fog flowing downward sandwiched between two flows of air.</p>
]]></summary></entry><entry><title>Gelf: L1 Emulation, L2 Tunneling, using an HTTP Client</title><category term="Fun"/><category term="iPhone"/><category term="networking"/><category term="tether"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/4/10/gelf-l1-emulation-l2-tunneling-using-an-http-client.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/4/10/gelf-l1-emulation-l2-tunneling-using-an-http-client.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2012-04-10T23:00:16Z</published><updated>2012-04-10T23:00:16Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>Simply: Gelf uses an <span class="caps">HTTP </span>client to bridge two or more networks. The iPhone is the primary use case; it has access to both <span class="caps">AT&amp;T'</span>s mobile network as well as an ad-hoc network. You can bridge the two using Gelf, without running any code on the iPhone, aside from client-side <span class="caps">HTML </span>and JavaScript.</p>
<p>This achieves a non-jailbroken, non-rooted, poor-man's network tether. Here's the catch, Gelf needs to run on a device inside each target network. Gelf functions as the L2 tunnel end-points, and the L1 emulation: achieved through an <span class="caps">HTTP </span>client.</p>]]></summary></entry><entry><title>CODEGATE 2012 - Network 100 Writeup</title><category term="CTF"/><category term="CTFs"/><category term="codegate"/><category term="networking"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/2/26/codegate-2012-network-100-writeup.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/2/26/codegate-2012-network-100-writeup.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2012-02-26T23:49:27Z</published><updated>2012-02-26T23:49:27Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>Take a look at Eindbazen's write-up on <a href="http://eindbazen.net/?p=855">Network 100</a>.</p>
<p>I wanted to do the same write-up, highlighting an alternate path. (This will be the last <span class="caps"><span class="caps">CODEGATE</span></span> 2012 write-up of mine, since both Leetmore and Eindbazen have all the other challenges we solved well documented.)</p>
<p>You start with a file: <a href="http://repo.shell-storm.org/CTF/CodeGate-2012/Network100/A0EBE9F0416498632193F769867744A3"><span class="caps">A0EBE9F0416498632193F769867744A3</span></a></p>
<p>And a note:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Someone have leaked very important documents. We couldn't find any proof without one <span class="caps"><span class="caps">PCAP </span></span>file. But this file was damaged.</p>
<p>&iexcl;&Oslash; The password of disclosure document is very weakness and based on Time, can be found easily.</p>
<p>Cryptographic algorithm is below.
Msg = "ThisIsNotARealEncryption!SeemToEncoding"<br />
Key = 0x20120224 (if date format is 2012/02/24 00:01:01)<br />
Cryto = C(M) = Msg * Key = 0xa92fd3a82cb4eb2ad323d795322c34f2d809f78</p>
<p>Answer: Decrypt(Msg)</p>
</blockquote>
]]></summary></entry><entry><title>CODEGATE 2012 - Forensics 200 Writeup</title><category term="CTF"/><category term="codegate"/><category term="forensics"/><category term="writeups"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/2/26/codegate-2012-forensics-200-writeup.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/2/26/codegate-2012-forensics-200-writeup.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2012-02-26T20:28:26Z</published><updated>2012-02-26T20:28:26Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>The challenge starts with a file and description:</p>
<p>File: <a href="http://repo.shell-storm.org/CTF/CodeGate-2012/Forensic200/C1E4775363DE0885E8360ED9A13A86B8"><span class="caps">C1E4775363DE0885E8360ED9A13A86B8</span></a></p>
<div id="magicdomid156" class="ace-line"><span>Question:</span></div>
<blockquote>
<p>When IU who lives in Seoul tried to do <span class="caps">SQL</span> Injection attack a certain <span class="caps">WEB </span>site, suddenly the browser was closed abnormally. What is the <span class="caps">SQL</span> Injection value she tried to enter and when the browser was closed? The time is based on Korea Standard Time(UTC +09:00)</p>
<p>Time Format is <span class="caps">YYYY</span>-MM-DDThh:mm:ssTZD (TZD : +hh:mm or hh:mm)</p>
<p>Answer : injection_value|time
('|' is just a character)<br />
Convert ' ' to '_' for injection value.</p>
</blockquote>
]]></summary></entry><entry><title>Forensic Challenge: Help stop the Sbuxnet trojan!</title><category term="CSAW"/><category term="Fun"/><category term="challenge"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/2/10/forensic-challenge-help-stop-the-sbuxnet-trojan.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/2/10/forensic-challenge-help-stop-the-sbuxnet-trojan.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2012-02-11T03:51:20Z</published><updated>2012-02-11T03:51:20Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>This is a fun forensic challenge created originally for <span class="caps"><span class="caps"><span class="caps">NYU'</span></span></span>s <span class="caps"><span class="caps"><span class="caps">CSAW</span></span></span> Capture the Flag Finals event. The story behind the challenge, along with additional forensic challenges were also used for <span class="caps"><span class="caps"><span class="caps">ACSAC'</span></span></span>s Tracer Fire class. Now I'm hosting both the forensic image and command and control server on the net so anyone can play.</p>
<p>Begin here: [challenge01.c0.cx] <i>(the challenge is over, thanks to those who played!)</i></p>
<p>Tools / Techniques / Skills involved:</p>
<ul>
<li>Filesystem forensic analysis</li>
<li>Email forensics and cryptographic tools</li>
<li>Python, small bit of source code analysis</li>
<li>Filetype header analysis, image forensics</li>
<li>Minor <span class="caps"><span class="caps"><span class="caps">HTML</span></span></span>/HTTP understanding</li>
<li>Patience, etc...</li>
</ul>
]]></summary></entry><entry><title>Offensive Defense: Protect your high-hanging fruit ...from birds and stuff</title><category term="Fun"/><category term="defensive"/><category term="offensive"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/1/15/offensive-defense-protect-your-high-hanging-fruit-from-birds.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2012/1/15/offensive-defense-protect-your-high-hanging-fruit-from-birds.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2012-01-15T20:21:36Z</published><updated>2012-01-15T20:21:36Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>One of these days this webserver will be torn open by some low-hanging vulnerability. Sure, but that wont be very exciting, so let's think outside of the inevitable, and into the what-if.</p>

<p>What-if someone did break into this poor little webserver? Regardless of how they did it, what would they do? What would they find? Step 1: Break into my box, Step 2: ..., Step 3: Profit. You'll achieve profit without any 'Step 2' by killing my ego and any minuscule reputation I have among my friends. But assuming you're not out for defamation: let's think about the 'Step 2', and some possible defensive methods to protect a box once someone has broken in.</p>
]]></summary></entry><entry><title>SIM card curiosity, and a little Hardware Hacking</title><category term="DIY"/><category term="Fun"/><category term="Hardware"/><category term="RE"/><category term="SIM"/><id>http://prosauce.org/blog/2011/12/11/sim-card-curiosity-and-a-little-hardware-hacking.html</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://prosauce.org/blog/2011/12/11/sim-card-curiosity-and-a-little-hardware-hacking.html"/><author><name>Ted</name></author><published>2011-12-12T06:05:57Z</published><updated>2011-12-12T06:05:57Z</updated><summary type="html" xml:lang="en-US"><![CDATA[<p>A few months ago I took an interest in the layer 2/3 protocols (and their implementations) for mobile networks.  I quickly arrived at <span class="caps">SIM </span>card hacking and like a young schoolboy thought, “man if only I could MitM the hardware communication I could spoof other’s <span class="caps">SIM </span>cards and use free Internet!” Nope. Well, not nope, but it’s not that easy.</p>
]]></summary></entry></feed>